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East Timor in a state of terror 
While President Suharto in Jakarta and Foreign Minister Ali Alatas around the world have been 
engaged in damage limitation to convince governments that the Santa Cruz massacre was a 
'regrettable incident~ the situation in East Timor has deteriorated. A reign of terror has eclipsed the 
occupied island. In particular the role of the hawkish Brig. General Theo Syaf ei, the new commander 
in Dili, shows how 'law and order' is now being implemented in East Timor. 
Brig.General Theo Sy~fei has made it a matter of prestige 
and a personal crusade to maintain 'law and order' in East 
Timor. Ever since becoming KOLAKOPS (the special 
operational command) commander, he has repeatedly made 
it clear that he will not pursue the soft approach of his 
predecessor. General Theo, an old Timor hand, has put the 
clock back to the late seventies and early eighties, when 
military rule was virtually absolute. The 'opening up' of the 
last three years is now on the way out; every measure taken 
by General Theo reinforces thi~. 
The new 'old' approach 
Brig.Gen. Theo Syafei was among the invasion troops in 
December 1975 and has spent nine years on active duty in 
East Timor. This includes the bloodiest period from 1975 
to 1980. 
From the moment he was appointed commander in 
January, General Theo Syafei has made it clear that he is in 
charge. The press has published one warlike statement after 
another from the new commander, who makes no secret of 
his belligerent approach. Here are some examples: 
On the Santa Cruz killings: , 
.... '..Thus, as I have said, if something similar to the 12 
November event were to happen under my leadership, the 
number of victims would probably be higher. [Editor, 14 
March 1992] 
On running East Timor: 
Excerpts from an inteiyiew in Kotnpas, 17 March 1992: 
Q.: You have served in East Timor for nine years. What are 
the issues in Timorese society? Why do incidents occur so 
often1 
TS: The crux of the matter is that in many cases we have 
not been decisive enough and have lacked consistency. 
Besides there are still factors which make East Timor 
unstable. We need to be 1nore consistent. 
Q: It seems that every time a foreign official pays a visit, 
demonstrations occur. Can you explain that? 
TS: We have to remember: Ea.st Timor belongs to us. Why 
do we have to receive all those foreign officials? Someone 
wh.o has donated a 4km water-pipe is received with more 
honours than our own Inspector-General. Their kind of aid 
is not comparable to the efforts poured in by our Republic. 
Q: Why then do demonstrations still occur? 
TS: It's like this. We thought that by showing love to the 
people, it would work both ways, but it didn't turn out like 
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that on that day. [the day of Santa Cruz bloodbath, TA-
POL] Our love was taken as being a sign of indecision and 
weakness. In the villages our programme functions wells 
and is accepted. But in the city where things have been 
'polluted~ it was interpreted as indecision, an attitude of 
wait-and-see. Moreover, there is fertile soil for agitation 
and propaganda with an estimated 8,000 people unem-
ployed in Dili. 
Q: About people's attitudes, what happens if they adopt an 
anti-Indonesia stance? 
TS: That is impossible. This is the territory of the Republic 
of Indonesia. 
Q: So what attitude will ABRl (the armed forces) take? 
TS: I'll say to my troops: win over the people. The people 
are obliged to follow. If not, please flee to the bush. 
Conditions in Dili must be made not favourable [original 
English] for them. If they use public transport, they have to 
feel this is not a Fretilin bus. The cinema is not a Fretilin 
owned cinema. We will create such a situation. 
Q: If they flee to the bush, then what? 
TS: Please, please let them go to the bush. If they go to the 
bush, they become GPK [security disruptor gangs]. 
Q: In the post 12 November period, it seems the security 
approach has been stepped up? 
TS: /'in only restoring ABRI standards. Demonstrations 
don't exist according to Indonesian law. 
Tough words backed by tough measures 
Syafei's tough language has been backed · by tough 
measures. East Timor, a little more relaxed in the period of 
'opening up', has now moved in the opposite direction, 
comparable to the early years after the invasion. 
The new miUtary commander of East Timor, 
the 'never smiling' General Theo Syafei. 
Neither the visit of Amos Wako, the special UN envoy, 
nor the high-profile journey of the Peace Mission by the 
Lusitania Expresso led to demonstrations in Dili. The 
reason is clear: General Theo Syafei left nothing to chance 
in his determination to forestall any disturbance. By using 
massive force and a huge military presence, he 'passed the 
test with flying colours'. From crack of dawn on the day of 
Wako's arrival, row upon row of troops were spread across 
the fields and in between the trees surrounding Comoro 
airport. The troops were stationed there from five in the 
morning and remained in place even in during a heavy 
downpour, to await the arrival of Wako. During Wako's 
brief visit, General Syafei personally inspected the town 
throughout the day. In the afternoon, drenched by the rain, 
he watched a Jocal footba11 match between two kampungs, 
to make sure it was only a football match. He spent the 
night in the room next to Wako's in Hotel Mahkota. 
Combat readiness for the Peace Boat 
The measures taken to meet the Lusitania Expresso were 
even more ferocious. General Theo created a special task 
force [Satgasus, Satuan Tugas Chusus] of 1500 people 
which was kept in a state of combat readiness for alJ 
eventualities. Things were placed on a war footing so as to 
enhance the dominant role of the military. Weeks before the 
Lusitania Expresso was anywhere near the waters of 
Timor, Syafei started arrestmg people in Dili, including the 
village-head of Santa Cruz, Jacobus dos Santos, who was 
accused of preparing a welcome for the Peace Mission. 
The Peace Mission was portrayed by ABRI as a political 
provocation. Several layers of 'defence' were set up. The 
first was the outer cordon in the Timor waters, consisting 
of a destroyer, corvettes, frigates and landing craft backed 
up by planes and helicopters. In case some passengers 
managed to get ashore, a second line of defence was 
formed. The six police subdistricts from Liquica, west of 
Dili, to Viqueque on the south coast, were charged with 
taking care of the 'unwanted guests'. The infamous pagar 
betis method was employed, a 'fence of legs' of people 
stretching along the coast for more than three hundred miles 
from Liquica to Viqueque, to stop the aliens from landing. 
In case the second line of defence proved unable to prevent 
foreigners from entering Dili, there was another line 
consisting of military and police forces, who were combat-
ready to receive them in Dili. 
Meanwhile, people in Dili were prevented from going to 
the beaches to look out for the boat. Anti-riot units were on 
patrol in Dili from mid-February, creating an atmosphere 
of fear and tension. 
Theo Syafei' s overhaul 
In the brief period since becoming Ko.lakops commander, 
Syafei has conducted a major overhaul of the structure. 
Although continuing the territorial operation of the two 
former commanders, Sintong Panjaitan and Rudy Warouw, 
the thrust of Operasi Morris Diak [Operation Good Life] 
under Theo Syafei has taken a different direction. Previous-
ly, the hearts-and-minds strategy of Morris Diak was 
implemented partly through persuasion. Theo Syafei is now 
openly critical of his predecessor. Asked how his strategy 
differed from Brig.Gen. Warouw's, he said: 
The position and policy of ABRI never change. Our mission 
is to bring stability in East Timor. In a technical sense our 
approaches are different. Pak Warouw had his love and 
caring approach. But as I see it, because of a different 
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culture, his approach came to be seen as indecision. Some 
regard the ·soft approach as a weakness. I only want to 
stress the importance of restoring ABRl's credibility and to 
make sure that softness is by no means weakness. This is 
the position I want to put across. And indeed, this position 
has been accepted by many. /Suara Pembaruan, 4.III.92) 
Syafei's approach is fully backed by ABRI headquarters in 
Jakarta. For Dili alone the Morris Diak territorial operation 
ha~ been allotted 2.3 billion rupiahs (more than one million 
US dollars). This amounts to 88 million rupiahs for each of 
the 26 neighbourhoods in Dili. The objective is to drive the 
'anti-integrationists' into an impossible position. A special 
territorial battalion, Battalion 'Red Bear'/641 from West 
Kalimantan, has been assigned for the job in Dili. It will 
stay for one year, with units in every one of the 26 neigh-
bourhoods. The former scheme of classifying villages as 
green [relatively safe), orange [so-so] and red [security-
threatening] zones still applies. On average, 30 soldiers 
have been stationed in each neighbourhood in addition to 
the existing · structures of military subdistrict, police 
subdistrict and para-military forces. As Timorese in Dili 
whisper: "Before, they were everywhere in the streets, now 
they have entered our bedrooms. " 
Under Warouw, there was still a grey area of people not 
openly expressing anti-integration feelings. But Theo 
Syafei will only tolerate people being 'with us or against 
us'. There can be no 'floating mass', People must either 
accept Indonesian domination or join the guerrillas. In El 
Salvador and the Philippines, the hearts-and-minds strategy 
came to be known as low intensity conflict, this term has 
not been applied to Indonesia's military strategy in East 
Timor. General Theo Syafei's strategy resembles this type 
of conflict, so it is now possible to speak about a low 
intensity conflict in East Timor. All the ingredients are 
there: separating the guerrillas from the population, focusing 
on control of the population, combining military duties with 
civic duties and using all kinds of intelligence operations. 
Streamlining intelligence 
The use of intelligence has always been excessive in East 
Timor. Each wing, the air force, the navy, the police and 
the army, have their own intelligence. In the army KOIA -
KOPS had its own intelligence unit, the territorial com-
mands from Korem, Kodim down to Koramil, the military 
sub-district command, all had their own intelligence. 
Moreover there was a combined, intelligence task force 86, 
a special intelligence unit for sector C (Dili) and each 
battalion also had its own intelligence. The two national 
intelligence agencies BAKIN and BA/S were also repre-
sented in East Timor. On top ·of that, the prosecution 
service had its own intelligence unit. In the last few years, 
the different intelligence units have competed with each 
other. As a result of using Timorese informers, quality fell 
because of misinformation and half-truths. Special intelli-
gence units consisting of East Timorese were established, 
Satgas Elang [Hawk Task Force] and the Railakan unit. 
Syafei soon recognised that the situation was chaotic. The 
military now admit that intelligence units often overacted. 
The 28 October incident at Motael church, the prologue of 
the 12 November tragedy, is cited as an example of this, 
when fighting took place between Satgas Elang personnel 
and Timorese youth and two people died, including Sebas-
tiao GDmes. Syafei has decided to disband the different 
inteUigence units and establish a coordinating body to 
centralise everything. 
EAST TIMOR-
Nobody talks about 'opening up' East Timor any more; the 
slender margins of the last three years have disappeared. It 
is back to the grim reality of absoiute military rule in East 
Timor. Brig.-General Theo Syafei, the archetype of a 
hardliner, clearly enjoys his new job. He wants to be known 
as a tough guy and his reign of terror is rampaging all over 
East Timor. 
The presence of military is the daily routine 
in the streets of East Timor. 
Terror confirmed by visitors 
People who have visited East Timor since Santa Cruz; 
confirm that brutality is a daily occurrence, with an atmos-
phere of fear and the military displaying their arrogance. 
The US journalist Peter Goodman, a freelancer based in 
Jakarta, visited East Timor in February and was told to 
leave because he did not possess a travel permit. He went 
to East Timor for the visit of Amos Wako and had told the 
authorities of his journalistic intentions. He has given a 
graphic account of the situation in Dili : 
Dili is dominated by fear, the streets devoid of activity 
throughout much of the day. On one recent morning, 
virtually everyone had a quick look about to see who else 
might be in the area before saying so much as good 
morning to a foreigner. 
At least 10,000 Indonesian troops remain in East Timar 
and Dili has the air of a city under siege. 
On a steamy morning earlier this month, 500 soldiers in 
20 lorries stood in formation in a field in central Dili. All 
carried full packs and Ml6 assault rifles slung over their 
shoulders. Their commander addressed them loudly while 
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he stood beneath a flagpole, the red-and-white of Indo-
nesia lifted by a gentle breeze. Most East Timorese walking 
by did not even dare look. 
While none of the dozen or so soldiers at ease on the 
sides of the field cared to say where the men were going, 
several East Timorese said troops have been entering 
villages frequently of late. 
"They go from house to house, warning people not to 
make trouble, " said an elderly East Timorese as he sat 
beneath an enormous banyan tree on the edge of the 
crumbling broadwalk that fronts the harbour. "The soldiers 
come and beat people up. Many are taken away for 
questioning and often disappear. The military has killed 
many in the last few months." [Daily Telegraph, 28.II.1992] 
Reports by Indonesian journalists confirm Goodman's 
description, although their accounts, for obvious reasons, 
are more indirect. The reporting in the Indonesian press 
about the implementation of Syafei's policies is revealing 
enough to describe the atmosphere of terror in East Timor. 
Another foreigner who was recently banned from Indo 
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nesia is Sidney Jones, the Executive Director of Asia 
Watch, the US-based human rights organisation. She 
visited East Timor in February as a tourist and spent four 
days there. From the moment she and her colleague arri~ed 
in Dili, they were photographed and followed. The surveil-
lance ended only when they left Jakarta airpo~. Sidney 
Jones is an experienced East Timor researcher and her 
testimony is worth quoting: 
I was skeptical of accounts of post-massacre killings before 
going to East Timer. I am much more inclined to believe 
them now. In a place where the only checks on the military 
are a relatively powerless governor and a beleaguered 
Catholic church, where fear prevented many witnesses from 
giving testimony to the National Commission of Inquiry and 
still prevents ordinary conversations on the street, I began 
to understand why we weren't getting proof. [Testimony by 
Asia Watch before the US Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, 27.II.1992]. 
Life in East Timor under Indonesian occupation has always 
been wretched but under the hawkish Brig.Gen. Theo 
Syafei, the situation is ten times worse. 
Defendants challenge court's jurisdiction 
Thirteen East Timorese are now on trial in Dili and Jakarta. They were all arrested in the wake of the 
Santa Cruz massacre last November. The trials are being conducted by Indonesian courts but Indonesia 
is an occupying power whose presence in East Timor is illegal. Two defendants charged for subversion 
have challenged the court's jurisdiction to try them for upholding their right to self-determination. 
When their trials opened in Jakarta on 16 March 1992, the 
two defendants Fernando de Araujo, 26 years old, and 
Joao Freitas da Camara, 37, who face subversion charges 
for which the maximum penalty is death, objected to being 
identified as Indonesian citizens. "We are Portuguese 
citizens," they said. 
Five East Timorese, all students, have gone on trial in 
Jakarta. Besides Araujo and da Camara, they are: Agapito 
Cardoso, 25, Dominggus Bareto, 29, and Virgilio da 
Silva Guterres, 26, who are charged with 'inciting hatred 
towards the government' which carries a maximum penalty 
of seven years. 
Fernando de Araujo and Freitas da Camara are accused of 
having repeatedly spread hostility, hatred and insults against . 
the Indonesian government and of having engaged in a 
series of activities "to stir up unrest or ·anxieties among the 
population and between the Indonesian state and other 
countries". Their political activities were subversive because 
they aimed to take East Timor out of the Indonesian 
Republic. 
When Araujo was arrested in Bali last November, the 
security forces planted hand-grenades in his home, which 
suggested that he might face charges of armed insurrection. 
As far as is known, however, the indictment makes no 
mention of arms. The authorities are apparently satisfied 
that they can build a case of subversion simply on the 
grounds that he is anti-integration and has pursued political 
objectives aimed to win seJf-determination for East Timor. 
Contacting the outside world 
It is well known that the security authorities have been 
monitoring East Timorese activists in Java and Bali and 
tapping their phones for nearly two years. Much of the evi-
dence used by the prosecution is based on phone-taps ;of 
caJJs both internal and with the outside world. Last Febru-
ary, an army intelligence document leaked abroad identified 
members of the East Timorese students' organisation, 
Renetil, among them two of the men now on trial, Fernando'' 
de Araujo and Agapito Cardoso. The document accused 
them of disseminating information to the outside world, 
contacting the International Red Cross or other groups "to 
send out information discrediting the Indonesian govern-
ment and mobilising support", and sending information to 
foreign journalists or tourists. [See TAPOL Bulletin, No 
105, June 1991] 
In a submission to the UN Decolonisation Committee last 
August, Amnesty Internationa) said: 
" ... none of the student activities described in the document 
is_ unlawful an~ non~ invo_lve~ the use or advocacy of 
violence. Especially disturbing is the fact that the activities 
considered threatening and worthy of investigation by 
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military intelligence involve efforts to monitor and dissemi-
~te information about human rights and political ques-
twns." 
The indictment against Fernando de Araujo focuses on his 
~fforts to :iend out information about human rights abuses 
m East TIIllor. When intelligence officers opened fire at 
Motael Church, Dili, on 28 October, 1991 killing two 
persons, he was informed about this by phone from Dili and 
relayed the information to Freitas da Camara in Jakarta :Skin~ him to pass it on to Carmel Budiardjo in London: 
to gam the sympathy of the outside world because human 
rights violations had taken place in East Timor". 
He is. also accused of receiving information from a 
clandestme contact in Dili about plans to organise a 
demonstration in Dili on 12 November 1991 to coincide 
with a visit by a UN human rights envoy and a Mass for 
Sebastiao who was killed at Motael Church on 28 October. 
He received information from clandestine sources in Dili 
about the massacre on 12 November and passed it on to the 
foreign press, foreign embassies in Jakarta and informed 
ACFOA in Australia . and Anmesty in London. 
Many of Fernando's contacts abroad are cited in the 
indictment - Geoff Robinson of Amnesty International, Jose 
~amos-H~rta an~ Alfredo Fereira, Timorese representatives 
m Australia, Luisa Teotonio Pereira of the Lisbon-based 
~lidarity group CDPM, Estevao Cabral, a Timorese living 
m London, the London-based Catholic Institute of Interna-
tional Relations, and Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL. In some 
instances, they are described as having donated money. 
Princen targetted 
HJC Princen, who chairs the Jakarta-based human rights 
organisation LPHAM, is also cited as having given support 
to East Timorese activists. Judging by the prominence given 
to this in some Indonesian newspapers, the authorities seem 
bent on discrediting him. He is likely to be caJJed to testify 
by the prosecution; he was unable to join the legal defence 
team because of this. He bas said he will make clear in 
court his support for the East Timorese students. Princen is 
Camara rejects court's jurisdiction 
Joao Freitas da Camara told a Jakarta court trying 
him for subversion that he rejects the court's juris-
diction and will refuse to attend further hearings. 
In a demurrer on 21 March, after the indictment 
was read out earlier in the week, Camara said Indo-
nesia has no right to try him and his East Timorese 
colleagues. "My/our question is the question of East 
Timor which is an international question that cannot 
be resolved unilaterally by the Indonesian government 
through the courts." 
He cited UN resolutions since 1975 upholding East 
Timor's self-determination, condemning the occupa- 11 
tion of East Timor by the Indonesian army and 
calling on Indonesia to withdraw, recognising Portu-
gal as the administering power and calling for a 
referendum in East Timor. 
East Timorese cannot remain silent in the face of 
army brutality in East Timor. "We have the right to 
defend ourselves and everything we did was in 
reaction to what the armed forces (ABRI) did against 
our people. Every act of violence by ABRI in East 
Timor is the consequence of the army's occupation of 
East Timor which has been condemned by the UN 
since 1975. Our right to organise is protected under 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Our 
purpose in organising was to defend our people by 
diplomatic means against ABRI's violence towards 
our people. It was not our aim to undermine the 
Indonesian state. We want Indonesia to resolve the 
East Timor question with justice and wisdom, and 
avoid a repetition of the Santa Cruz event on 12 
November 1991. 
. "If Indonesia has a poor reputation in the world, this 
is because of its own actions, not because of any 
attempt on our part to undermine the state." 
Camara ended his demurrer: 
"1. I object to this action and I refuse to attend 
further hearings. 
"2. I demand that my /our question be resolved 
through diplomatic channels under UN auspices. 
"If I am forced to attend the trial, I am entitJed to 
charge the Indonesian government with responsibility 
for aJJ ~he hu?1an rights violations perpetrated against 
East Timor smce the start of the occupation in 1975. 
"I demand that those responsible for the 12 Novem-
ber event when hundreds were killed and wounded 
should be tried in open court. What we did was only 
in reaction to this." 
Lawyers' demurrer 
In ~other demurrer, lawyers from the Legal Aid 
Institute who are defending Freitas da Camara chal-
lenged the court's right to charge him under the anti-
subversion act which is unconstitutional and undemo-
~ra~ic. The lawyers asked the court to reject the 
md1ctment and throw out the case. 
TAPOL Bulletin N:o. 110, April 19.92 5 
EAST TIMOR TRIALS 
already a 'banned person' and has been repeatedly refused 
permission to leave for Geneva to give testimony to the UN 
Human Rights Commission. 
Freitas da Camara and Araujo defiant 
Both defendants facing subversion charges presented 
demurrers declaring their refusal to be. tried in an 
Indonesian court. (See box for the demurrer of Freitas da 
Camara.) 
The charges against Freitas de Camara focus on his role 
in organising the 19 November demonstration in Jakarta. 
Since 1986, he allegedly received funds from among others: 
Frctilin in Darwin, the Catholic Institute of International 
Relations in Britain, Amnesty International in London, 
ACFOA [Australian Council for Overseas Aid), and HJC 
Princen of the League for the Defence of Human Rights in 
Joao Freitas da Camara, surrounded by journalists, at the 19 
November peaceful tkmonstration at the UN Office in Jakarta. 
Jakarta who allegedly gave him Rp. 50,000 a month from 
March 1990 to January 1991. . 
Another of his 'crimes' is that since 1986, he ~upphed 
1. · East TlDlor to information about government po icy m 1 agencies abroad, the foreign press and various peop e. at 
home and abroad, to the detriment of the Indonesian 
government. The data he supplied came "from sources that 
ought not to have been regarded as reliable, whereas he 
made no effort to check the accuracy of the information 
with the competent authorities". [Berita Buana, 17.III.1992) 
Fernando Araujo has been seriously ill during much of the 
time in detention and was taken to hospital a few days after 
being indicted, suffering from a I?dney . complaint. He 
appeared in court on 23 March, looking frail and unsteady. 
But even so, he was defiant as he read out his demurrer and 
spoke of the harsh treatment during his arrest and detention 
in Bali. An observer who attended the session said there 
were dozens of military and intelligence personnel milling 
around inside and outside the courtroom. When Fernando 
was handing out copies of his demurrer to journalists and 
other members of the public, several men grabbed some of 
the copies and tore them to pieces. All those attending the 
session, including journalists, were required to hand in their 
identity cards. 
Forced to become an Indonesian 
The trials of Agapito Cardoso, Dominggus Bareto and 
Virgilio da Silva Guterres started in Jakarta on 17 March. 
They are accused of having been "instructed by J<?ao Freitas 
da Camara to come to Jakarta after the 12 November 
incident". Along with other East Timorese activists, they 
attended several meetings to plan a demonstration to the 
UN office in Jakarta. The demonstration took place on 19 
November, attended by 70 persons, carrying banners and 
posters, so as to "embarrass the Indonesian government and 
demonstrate their rejection of East Timor's integration into 
the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia". 
After the indictment was read out, Virgilio told the court, 
"I was forced to become an Indonesian citizen." 
Two of the three are defended by LBH lawyers. The third, 
Dominggus Bareto, has refused legal aid and will conduct 
his own defence. 
Dili demonstrators go on trial for subversion 
Eight trials in Dili are taking place in more difficult circumstances than those in Jakarta. Shortly 
before they commenced, foreign journalists were barred from visiting East Timor. An Australian jurist 
sent by the International Commission of Jurists to observe the trials had great difficulty gaining entry 
into court. Monitoring these trials is proving far more difficult than the trials in Jakarta. 
When the two subversion trials commenced in Dili, the 
court tried to force the defendants to accept a court-
appointed lawyer. For both trials, a team of lawyers from 
the Jakarta-based Legal Aid Institute (LBH), had come to 
Dili, having been given powers-of-attorney by relatives of 
the accused. Twice the judge refused to allow them to act, 
using spurious arguments regarding lack of authorisation to 
keep them out. Eventually, after the Supreme Court in 
Jakarta passed down two rulings backing the LBH's 
entitlement to conduct a defence in Dili, the Dili court was 
forced to back down. 
This means that the defendants have been allowed to 
exercise their basic right under Indonesian law to be 
defended by lawyers of their own choice. Yet East Timor 
· is under illegal oq;upatiQn and the right of the forces of 
occupation to treat East Timorese as subversives under 
Indonesia's anti-subversion law because they have engaged 
in activities in support of self-determination is grossly 
unjust and highly questionable. The LBH won against the 
Dili court when the Supreme Court pronounced that all 
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lawyers licenced by the Minister of Justice are entitled to 
function there. The military commander tried to prevent the 
local lawyer from being replaced but Jakarta realised this 
would have exposed the trials to even more condemnation. 
Independent observer gains entry 
Rodney Lewis, an Australian lawyer representing the 
International Commission of Jurists in Geneva, the London-
based International Bar Association and Law Asia, encoun-
tered considerable obstructions before fmally gaining entry 
to one of the Dili trials. He was forced to wait for several 
days in Bali before obtaining clearance to travel to Dili. 
When he arrived at the courthouse in Dili to attend the trial 
of Gregorio da Cunha Saldhana, security officials refused 
to let him in. It was only after vigorously protests that he 
was eventually allowed into the courtroom. 
The two subversion trials 
Two of the eight on trial in Dili face subversion charges 
and a possible death sentence: Gregorio da Cunha Sald-
anha, 29, formerly a nurse at the Dili General Hospital, and 
Francisco Miranda Branco, 41, a civil servant. 
The case against Gregorio rests on two basic charges -
first, that he was active in two clandestine organisations, the 
Gregorio Saldanha, on trial for subversion. 
'Central Executive' and the 'National Resistance Committee 
of the East Timorese Youth' which both form part of the 
National Council of Maubere Resistance under the leader-
sh~p .of Xanana Gusmao; second, that he played a prominent 
role in a number of mass actions, since 1990, protesting 
against Indonesian rule, including the action in Dili when 
the US ambassador was on a visit in early 1990. 
He is further charged with preparing mass demonstrations 
that were to have welcomed the Portuguese parliamentary 
mission (cahcelled at the last minute). · The climax, accord-
ing to the indictment, was his involvement in planning the 
demonstration held · in Dili on 12 November, to coincide 
with the visit of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, 
Professor Kooijmans. At this demonstration, Fretilin flags 
and photos were displayed and slogans insulting the 
Indonesian government were used. The demonstration led 
to the 'Dili incident' which ended in many number of people 
being killed (what Indonesian newspapers now call the 
'bloody demonstration'). This, according to the prosecution, 
makes him liable under Indonesia's anti-subversion law. 
Six others to be tried 
Although the Attorney-General originally announced that 
32 East Timorese would go on trial in Dili, the number was 
T TIMQR TRIALS 
later reduced to eight. Besides the two who face subversion 
charges, the six being tried under the Criminal Code are: 
Bonifacio Magno, Juvencio de Jesus Martins, Filomeno 
da Silva Ferreira, Carlos dos Santos Lemos, Satumino 
da Costa Belo and Jacinto das Neves Raimundo Alves. 
Released into the clutches of the army 
The 24 prisoners who were not selected for court 
proceedings have now been placed in army custody. 
Each of them has been handed over to a company 
commander with instructions to tum them into 
"reliable Indonesians", untainted by anti-integration 
sentiments and willing to take part in "development". 
After their 'release' from police custody, mystery 
surrounded their whereabouts wher. their families told · 
lawyers they had not returned home. Then came a 
statement from Brig.Gen. Theo Syafei revealing that 
they were being subjected to a special programme of 
indoctrination. "They all fell under the influence of 
separatist agitation," he said. "If they are returned to 
society, they could be given a heroes' welcome or 
some people could tum on them and kill them." 
"So, I am giving them special treatment. Each 
company commander will receive one detainee to be 
given guidance and educated into becoming good 
Indonesians who will participate in development." 
There is no time limit; it all depends on how 
quickly they change their outlooks. They will under-
go 'Kolakops-style indoctrination' in locations outside 
Dili, he said. [Suara Karya, 9.III.92) 
STOP PRESS 
Indonesia ends aid ties with Holland and 
cancels IGGI meeting 
Coordinating Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs, 
Radius Prawiro announced on 25 March that Indonesia has 
suspended aid relations with Holland. Holland was one of 
three countries which imposed economic sanctions against 
Indonesia after the Santa Cruz massacre. 
Prawiro accused the Dutch Government of using aid "to 
intimidate" Indonesia by linking it to human rights in East 
Timor and to. implementation of the family planning 
programme. Jakarta also strongly resented criticism from 
Holland when communist prisoners were executed in 1990. 
The Indonesian government has asked for the cancellation 
of this year's meeting of the international aid consortium, 
the Inter- Governmental Group on Indonesia, chaired by 
Holland, and wants the World Bank to establish a forum for 
consultations between Indonesia and the donor countries. 
The announcement, which took the Dutch government 
completely by surprise, came shortly before Jan Pronk, 
Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation, was to visit 
Indonesia in preparation for this year's IGGI meeting.· 
Jakarta's unprecedented move is clearly .· intended as a 
warning to all donor countries not to link aid with human 
rights criteria, a policy that has been generally accepted, in 
principle at least, by all the member-states of the European 
Community. 
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UN Commission adopts half-hearted decision 
The UN Commission on Human Rights at its 48th session (February-March 1992), adopted a 
consensus declaration "deploring" ·the Santa Cruz massacre and calling on Indonesia "to improve the 
human rights situation in East Timor" and to ''facilitate access to East Timor for human rights 
organisations". Although this means that East Timor is now placed on the Commission~ agenda and 
will be discussed at its 49th Session next year, the statement was a great disappointment, an anti-
climax to the worldwide condemnation of Indonesia in the wake of the Santa Cruz massacre last 
November. · 
East Timor was one of the most visible and widely dis-
cussed issues at this year's Commission meeting. Numerous 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) condemned the 
massacre and Indonesia's 16-year record of atrocities, 
including the International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty 
International, Pax Christi, the International League for 
Rights and Liberation of Peoples, and the Paris-based 
International League for Human Rights. 
A resolution drafted 
Halfway through the Session, a resolution drafted by the 
European Community was tabled with the endorsement of 
no fewer than 32 countries of which 14 have voting rights 
as members of the Commission. The draft expressed "grave 
concern" at the unprovoked violence used by Indonesian 
security forces on 12 November 1991 which occurred in the 
context of a deteriorating human rights situation in East 
Timor. While "welcoming the prompt response" of the 
Indonesian government and the measures it had taken, it 
made specific reference to the UN's "Principles on the 
Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, 
Arbitrary and Summary Executions" which set out the 
criteria for a proper, independent inquiry of an incident 
such as the Santa Cruz massacre. 
While condemnations of Indonesia continued to be made 
at the Session, behind-the-scenes manoeuvres were under 
way to persuade Portugal to reach an agreement with 
Indonesia. As with other issues discussed by the Commis-
sion, notably Tibet, Asian .countries ganged up to support 
each other, with active backing from the Japanese delega-
tion. Leading the lobbying to deflect criticism of Jakarta 
was the Australian delegation. The US team also backed 
these efforts, while working on a similar endeavour to sab-
otage a resolution condemning China on the question of 
Tibet. 
Talks behind the scene 
Talks between Portugal and Indonesia dragged on for 
several days, the purpose being to agree on a consensus 
statement incorporating all the substantive points from the 
draft resolution and obtaining formal undertakings from 
Indonesia about a UN report on human rights in East Timor 
and access for human rights organisations. 
But why did Portugal, having won EC support for a 
resolution and secured endorsement from many other 
countries, devote so much attention to reaching a consensus 
with Indonesia? Although there seemed to be a majority in 
the Commission for the resolution, the danger was that 
before the resolution could be put to a vote, Asian delega-
tions would steamroll a no-action motion through, prevent-
ing a vote on the resolution. Portugal preferred not to risk 
a defeat so opted for a consensus statement. Among NGOs 
in Geneva, many felt that Portugal should have pressed for 
a resolution although this meant risking defeat. 
The Australia-Indonesia holy alliance 
The final hours before the statement was read out were 
tense and acrimonious. The chief Australian delegate, hand 
in glove with the 25-strong Indonesian team, accused 
Portugal of deceit over whether the consensus would be 
expressed as a binding 'decision' rather than meaningless 
declaration. The statement which was finalJy read out is 
described in the introductory paragraph as a statement 
"which has been agreed by consensus by the Commission" 
and is initialled by the heads of the Dutch, Portuguese and 
British delegations (the EC 'troika') and the Indonesian 
delegation. Although in formal terms, the wording can 
hardly be read as binding undertakings by Indonesia, the 
consensus statement provides required standards against 
which Indonesian action in East Timor can now be 
measured. 
In paragraph 3, the Commission "calls upon the 
Indonesian authorities to ensure that aU civilians arrested on 
the occasion (of the massacre) are treated humanely, that 
those brought to trial are assured of proper legal represen-
tation and fair trial and that those not involved in violent 
activities are released without delay". 
Two Timorese lackeys were part of the Indonesian delegation in 
Genna. Francisco Lopes da Cruz {kft), member of the AllvisoTJ 
Council and Guilherme dos Santos, chair of the Local Assembly. 
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[Even before the ink was dry,' Indonesia was contradicting 
this consensus on every single point, in the courtrooms in 
Jakarta and Dili!] 
Paragraph 5 reads as follows: 
"The Commission urges the Government of Indonesia to 
improve the human rights situation in East Timor; com-
mends the report entitled 'Visit by the Special Rapporteur 
to Indonesia and East Timor' of its Special Rapporteur on 
Torture following his visit at the invitation of the 
Indonesian Government; urges the Indonesian authorities 
to take the necessary steps to implement its recommenda-
tions and looks forward to a report thereon; calls on the 
Indonesian Government to facilitate access to East Timor 
for additional humanitarian organisations and for human 
rights organisations; and requests the Secretary General to 
continue to follow closely the human rights situation in East 
Timor and to keep the Commission informed at its 49th 
session." 
Indonesia, so widely denounced since last November, has 
come through largely unscathed. As The Guardian wrote in 
an editorial entitled The Human Rights Omission': "Cam-
paigners have to settle for what they can get.. .. Jakarta's 
good faith can now be put to the test." Unfortunately, 
pledges of good faith by Indonesian diplomats in Geneva 
are light years away from the reality experienced by the 
East Timorese, under the jackboot of Brig.General Syafei 
and his thugs. 
However, human rights organisations and solidarity groups 
should use the Commission statement as a yardstick and 
make known to the UN Centre for Human Rights in Geneva 
[address: UN Secretariat, Geneva] each and every instance 
where Indonesia departs from the undertakings it made at 
the Commission. This may be of little comfort to the East 
Timorese as the grip of repression tightens each day, but it 
make it possible to build up a strong case against Indonesia 
when the Commission discusses the human rights situation 
in East Timor under Item 12 (n) at its meeting next year. 
East Timor round-up 
Foreign journalists barred from Timor 
Foreign journalists have been barred from visiting East 
Timor. An Information Ministry official said no recommen-
dations for foreign journalists to go to East Timor would be 
given "for the time being". He added, as Orwell would 
have predicted, that "this is not a ban". 
Although since 1989, journalists have been free to visit 
the territory, the authorities there have insisted that they 
come with a surat jalan or travel permit from the Ministcy. 
A number of journalists say applications to go to East 
Timor have been turned down; others have been told not to 
go even though they have made no request to do so. 
Among those who were refused permission is a Jakarta-
based journalist from a Japanese newspaper. 
At first when tht. ban was announced in late February, it 
was said to be related to the scheduled visit to East Timor 
by a Peace Mission aboard the Portuguese car-ferry, 
Lusitania Express, but later Information Ministry officials 
would not ·Jink the ban with the Peace Mission. [Jakarta 
Post, 28.II.1992] 
According to the Far Eastern Economic Review, there are 
"signs that the army is preparing to close East Timor to 
foreign journalists and tourists as a prelude to a renewed 
military crackdown". [12.III.1992] 
Last foreign journalist in East Timor 
The ban came a week after a US freelance journalist based 
in Jakarta was ordered to leave East Timor. The journalist, 
Peter Goodman, writes for Japan Times, the South China 
Morning Post and other newspapers, as weH as several US 
radio stations. 
Goodman told Associated Press in Jakarta that he had 
been _questioned by security officers in his hotel room. 
According to Kompas, he was prevented from ·1eaving the 
hotel to travel to Same and had to leave East Timor 
immediately. He had travelled to East Timor to cover the 
one-day visit there by UN special envoy, Amos Wako. 
In an article published in London's Daily Telegraph 
[28.II.1992), Goodman described how Indonesian troops are 
still cracking down hard in East Timor in the wake of last 
year's massacre. The article is entitled: "East Timorese defy 
terror tactics in the fight to be free". He published a similar 
article in New York Newsday [29.II.1992) 
Hansip, pt1ramilitary units in Dili 
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US to train more ABRI officers 
The US government wants more cash from Congress to 
train 180 military and security officers "to prevent the 
recurrence of similar incidents to the bloody Dili killings on 
12 November", according to a report of the General 
Accounting Office (GAO), a congressional investigative 
agency. The report, prepared at the request of members of 
the Senate and House foreign affairs committees, said there 
were no US-trained Indonesian officers in senior-level 
positions in East Timor on 12 November, but after the 
incident "at least seven" US-trained officers were placed in 
positions of responsibility for East Timor operations and on 
commissions established by President Suharto to investigate 
the incident. 
The report would appear to affirm that US-trained officers 
are being brought in as part of the changes being wrought 
by East Timor's new commander, Brig.Gen. Theo Syafei 
with his tough policy of not allowing the Timorese the 
slightest leeway to express their aspirations. The request for 
more cash on the grounds that more US-trained officers 
might have prevented the massacre, is being used to counter 
members of Congress like that of Senator Claiborne Pell 
who ask, "Why should we give Indonesia a nickel?". 
Behind the claim that more US-trained officers would 
improve Indonesia's performance in East Til!lor lies the 
implication that US army circles are critical of the situation 
in East Timor under its former, commander. 
The GAO report said that US and Indonesian officials 
suggested additional IMET (International Military Education 
and Training programme) training, "aimed at preventing the 
recurrence of incidents such as the shooting in East Tim or". 
GAO "found no IMET graduates among the 14 Indonesian 
army officers whom we have identified in the East Timor 
command structure on the day of the shooting incident. 
These officers held ranks from major-gene1al to lieutenant". 
[UPI, 6.III.1992] 
New solidarity coalition in Portugal 
Nearly one hundred organisations - church groups, peace 
organisations, youth and student groups, trade unions, 
regional coalitions and many more - have come together in 
Portugal to coordinate solidarity activities for East Timor. 
Since the Santa Cruz massacre, there has been a ground-
swelJ of activity throughout the country; many initiatives 
unknown in Portugal's history have been taken. 
The decision to work closely together was taken at a 
Convention for East Timor in Lisbon on 14 and 15 March 
1992, attended by more than 150 representatives from 96 
organisations. Among those who addressed the Convention 
was Jose Ramos-Horta, external spokesperson of the East 
Timor resistance, Roger Clark, jurist and expert on self-
determination and Dipa Ramelan, an Indonesian human 
rights activist from Jakarta, the first Indonesian to visit 
Portugal coming direct from the country, to take part in a 
solidarity action for East Timor. 
Actions agreed include a boycott on aJJ Indone~ian goods 
imported into Portugal, a sustained protest action against 
Shell for its decision to exploit East Timor oil reserves 
under the terms of the Timor Gap Treaty, and a Live Aid 
programme for East Timor. 
Many speakers on the platform and from the floor 
criticised Portugal's diplomacy for failing to take timely 
action. For instance, the government had failed to lodge a 
formal protest against Indonesia for blocking entry into 
Timor waters to the Portuguese vessel, Lusitania &press· 
The closing session on Sunday afternoon was particularly 
lively as many of those who had taken part in the Peace 
Mission for Timor aboard the Lusitania Express came to the 
Convention straight from the airport, having just returned 
from Darwin. 
Socialist International resolution 
At its meeting in Madrid on 13-14 March, the Presidium of 
the Socialist International adopted a resolution calling for 
"an Indonesian military withdrawal from East Timor and 
the organisation of a UN supervised referendum so that the 
East Timm:ese can determine their own political future". It 
also caJJed for direct negotiations between the Indonesian 
government, the East Timorese and Portugal. The presid-
ium reiterated the willingness expressed at the last Council 
meeting of the SI to organise a mission to visit East Timor 
immediately. 
Delegates from Japan, UK, Indonesia and Holland during t~e 
Annual Consultation of East Timor Solidarity Groups 111 
Geneva. 
Solidarity groups meet in Geneva 
East Timor solidarity groups from 13 countries held their 
twelfth annual consultation in Geneva from 14-16 Febru-
ary. Participants came from Indonesia, Australia, Japan, the 
United States, Canada, Belgium, France, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
The meeting reaffirmed its support for peace talks without 
preconditions, as proposed by East Timorese resistance 
leader, Xanana Gusmao. It welcomed the Portuguese 
government initiative in urging the restarting of UN-
supervised negotiations including Timorese representatives. 
The composition of the Timorese delegation should be 
decided by the resistance leadership inside East Timor. 
Promoting peace talks and the release of political 
prisoners were the top priorities of a plan for 1992. In 
response to a message from Xanana Gusmao (see page 24), 
the meeting expressed support and greetings to him and to 
the Timorese resistance and, to strengthen communications, 
conveyed the results of our discussions. 
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Extrajudicial killings in Aceh continue 
These days, human rights abuses in Aceh are rarely reported in the Indonesian press, but this does not 
mean that the situation has improved. Far from it. TAPOL has obtained reports from reliable sources 
indicating that killings, arrests, disappearances and torture continue unabated. 
Territorial operations 
The military situation in Aceh closely resembles the 
situation in East Timor. After a Jong period of epmbat 
operations, the army is gradually shifting to a territorial 
strategy, to prevent the guerillas from maintaining contact 
with the civilian population. In particular the three strong-
holds of GAM [Gerakan Aceh Merdel«l, Free Aceh Move-
ment], the districts of Pidie, North Aceh and East Aceh, 
have become the focus of a territorial military campaign. 
The operation is called PKT Ter [Proyek Kegiatan Terpadu 
TeritoriJ;ll, Integrated Territorial Project) and Jakarta has 
been generous with . extra-budgetary funds. The allocation 
for Pidie district is Rpl.1 billion [about US$500,000), for 
North Aceh, Rpl.3 billion and for East Aceh, Rpl billion. 
The money will be spent on the infrastructure, such as 
building roads and bridges, which means that Acehnese will 
be forced to contribute their labour without pay. On top of 
this, as in East Timor, the money will be used to recruit and 
train para-military gangs to reinforce 'law and order' in the 
region. 
Violations 
TAPOL has received reports of the following human rights 
violations occurring during first two months of 1992: 
On 8 January, Saleh bin Yusuf (24) was dr~gged from his 
bed at 1 in the morning by a Kopassus (red beret) unit. He 
was taken to Rancong Detention Centre, notorious for 
torture. His whereabouts are unknown at present. 
On 10 January, three village elders from Reubee in Pidie: 
Piah Syech (60), Ismael Kunyet (65) and Ismael Husin 
( 40), were dragged from their houses to the village square 
and shot dead for alleged Aceh Merdeka sympathies. 
On 12 January, Muhammad Sabi (28), from the village 
of Beureugang, Buloh Blang Ara subdistrict, Lhok Seum-
awe district, w~s arrested by a Kopassus unit. He was 
reportedly taken to the Rancong Detention Centre and has 
since disappeared. 
On 17 January, Ibrahim G. Panglima (65), from the 
same region, was summarily executed. His body was 
removed by the military and dumped in an unknown place. 
On 18 January, the son of Tengku Abdullah Tanoh 
Mirah, a local dignitary, was taken from his home by a red 
beret unit and taken to Rancong Detention Centre. His 
whereabouts are unknown. 
On 20 January, Bong Djamin (26) was arrested by the 
Kopassus in the town of Matang Kuli. He was one of the 
'wanted persons' whose photo appeared on a poster which 
was widely displayed by the Indonesian army. According to 
the report, Bong Djamin did not survive the torture in 
Rancong Prison. 
On 20 January, Sofyan Hasan (67) and his son Basri 
Hasan (35), from the village of Kunyet were arrested and 
summarily executed. 
On 24 January, Abdullah Pari (35) of Idi village in 
Peureulak was on his way home from the market. He was 
shot dead by an Indonesian soldier in front of his house -
no questions asked. 
On 26 January, Zainuddin bin Achmad (32) from the 
village of Paloh Punti, Pase was arrested at 2am and taken 
to Rancong Detention Centre. He has not been seen since. 
On 2 February, Ismael Bambong (52), suspected of being 
a GAM follower, was summarily executed by Indonesian 
soldiers. His body has been taken to an unknown location. 
As Asia Watch said in a report on Aceh issued on 19 
February 1992: "A string of deaths of alleged Aceh Mer-
deka leaders suggests that the government has been pursu-
ing a policy of shoot to kill and may have deliberately shot 
suspected leaders rather than taking them into custody." 
Another report obtained by TAPOL gives details of 20 
cases of extra-judicial killings in Pase in 1991 and gives 
details of a number of arrests in the region, made without 
warrants. 
The death of Yusuf Ali 
After a period of uncertainty it has been confirmed that 
Yusuf ~i, an important leader of GAM, was killed by 
Indonesian troops on 28 December 1991. His capture had 
become a matter of prestige for the Indonesian army and for 
months, thousands of troops were deployed to track hint 
do:wn with his unit. On 28 December in a place called 
Krueng Gunci, in the subdistrict of Peusangan, two platoons 
of Indonesian troops managed to track down the guerilla 
encampment. Yusuf Ali died of gunshot wounds and two 
of his guards Yahya bin Husain (25) and Bukhari (23) 
were also mortally wounded during the ambush. 
Yusuf Ali has a long record of defying Indonesian rule in 
Aceh and was Free Aceh commander for Pase for 10 years. 
In 1978 he was arrested by the Indonesian authorities and 
jailed for two years. The death of this commander is a great 
loss for the Aceh Merdeka movement. 
In jubilant mood, Colonel Sutrisno, intelligence officer of 
the Bukit Barisan Military Command announced the death 
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of Yusuf Ali: ''All the te"or in Aceh was under the 
command of Yusuf Ali" [Kompas, 30.XII.1992]. The body 
of the deceased was flown to Lhok Seumawe to be pres- · 
ented as a proof of a glorious victory by ABRI. Army 
chief-of-staff General Eddy Sudradjat flew to Aceh to 
grant the 22 soldiers involved in the ambush special 
promotions. 
The arrest of Mariani Yusuf Ali 
It is now also confirmed that Mariani Yusuf Ali, the wife 
of Yusuf Ali, has been arrested in the village of Cot 
Jeuram, in Pidie district. She is regarded as one of the most 
important leaders of the Free Aceh Movement from the 
Pase province. It is part of the tradition of Aceh that if the 
husband becomes a commander, the wife is often seen as a 
commander as well. The case of Teuku Umar and his wife 
Cut Nya Din who fought the Dutch for a long period, is the 
shining example. It is worth noting that these latter two are 
regarded as heroes by the Indonesians. 
Mariani Yusuf Ali 
Mariani Yusuf Ali reportedly led a women's resistance 
unit called Lasykar Inong Atjeh Sumatra ['Lasykar' means 
unit, while inong is Acehnese for women]. She was cap-
tured far away from the battle scene, 200 km to the west, 
and had apparently gone into a retreat position. She has 
been taken to the notorious Rancong Detention Centre near 
Lhok Seumawe where few prisoners survive to tell their 
tale. Latest reports from GAM sources confirm that Mariani 
Yusuf Ali is being torture and has been raped. Unless an 
international campaign is launched, it is feared her life 
might be in danger. ' 
"Overshadowed by the Timor massacre" 
Jakarta-based journalist, Margo Cohen, visited Aceh in 
January this year and wrote about what she called "Indone-
sia's hidden terror". [Independent on Sunday, 9.II.1992] In 
words reminiscent of the situation in East Timor she wrote 
that most Acehnese "remain reluctant to speak opeiily of the 
excesses aimed at the 3.4 million local people", adding that 
the local press has been warned against probing too deeply. 
She described the case of Abdurrahman Ed, a 57-year-
old illiterate rice farmer in the remote Acehnese village of 
Teungoh Reuba, who showed her a snapshot of his only 
son, 28-year-old, Mohamad Jafar. Jafar was detained by 
the military in August 1991, suspected of helping the 
rebels. Two witnesses said they saw Jafar beaten with wood 
and electric cable, blindfolded and loaded into a car. 
Nothing has been heard of him since. "Is Jafar alive, or 
not? If not, it should be reported," said Mr Ed. 
With the help of the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute which 
supported him in a previous land dispute, he appealed to the 
armed forces commander, ·General Try Sutrisno, and the 
governor of Aceh, Ibrahim Hassan, in a letter dated 15 
November. So far, he has had no reply. 
She also wrote of one East Acehnese woman -- who pre-
fered to remain unnamed -- who spent four months 
looking for her husband, who was seized by the military 
last April near the town of Peureulak. Whenever she got 
word of a corpse abandoned along a road or stream, she 
rushed to the scene. EventuaJJy she gave up, concentrating 
on the four small children she must bring up alone. 
Three sentenced in 'secret documents' trial 
After an adjournment lasting several weeks, the trials in 
Dili of three East Timorese accused of stealing and sending 
abroad documents from the East Timor military command 
have been resumed. 
In the last ~ue of TAPOL Bulletin, we incorrectly 
reported that they had been sentenced to nine and seven 
years based on a confusing series of press reports where 
prosecution demands for sentencing were mistaken for 
verdicts. When the trials resumed, evidence was heard from 
witnesses, which always precedes the prosecution's sen-
tencing demand. This suggests that the courts reverted to an 
earlier stage in the trials but the reasons for doing so are 
unclear. This confusion only highlights ~::e difficulty of 
monitoring court processes in Dili. 
On trial were Filismena dos Sant ... ., Conceicao, 29, a 
woman employed at the secretariat "- Korem, the Dili 
military command, Amarao de Araltjo, 30, a mechanic 
related to Filismena, and Afonso Rangel, 48, another 
relative who runs a business. Filismena was accused of 
stealing documents from korem, which were passed .to 
Rangel via Araujo to be sent abroad. All the defeadm 
were defended by Ponco Atmono, a local lawyer attachd 
to the courts. 
During his trial, Rangel retracted earlier statemen1- that ho 
used tourists as couriers; he now said he gave the envelopea 
containing documents to Bishop Belo, head of the ca 
Church, who undertook to transmit them abroad. 
surprising claim was potentially very damaging for 
Bishop, but after much press camme.nt;. the issue 
away. Some circles say this prowded :tJm authorities ·-~· 
useful tool to blackmail Belo iBtd toning do ai.tit' :U' .-1111 
the situation in East Timor. 
All 1hree were found ~ Fitismena &lllbKllUllll '~-1111 
sentenced to five years. Araje 
sentence. 
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Asia Watch on Aceh 
The US-based human rights organisation, Asia Watch, issued yet another special report on Aceh in 
February this year. Aceh was also highlighted in this year's US State Department Chapter on Indonesia 
in its report on the human rights situation. 
Asia Watch calls for international inquiry 
The Asia Watch report provides well-documented accounts 
of a number of summary executions and arrests during 1991 
and also in early 1992. The gravity of the human rights 
situation in Aceh is summed up in the report's opening 
paragraphs which are worth quoting in full: 
"As the international community condemned the massacre 
in East Timor on November 12, 1991 and pressed the 
Indonesian government to account fully for the killings, 
other human rights abuses attributed to the Indonesian 
military went largely ignored. In Aceh, for example, where 
as many as 1,000 may have died since mid-1989 in a 
combination of separatist guerrilla attacks and army 
reprisals, disappearances remain unresolved; suspected 
guerrillas continue to be shot on the spot rather than taken 
into custody, large numbers of people are believed to 
remain in unacknowledged detention and trials which 
violate international norms of fairness continue to take 
place. Asia Watch also remains concerned for the wellbeing 
of the few dozen refugees who returned "voluntarily" to 
Aceh after fleeing to Malaysia in 1991. No international 
organization had access to these people before they left 
Malaysia to ensure that they indeed were returning of their 
own accord or after their arrival back in Aceh, to ensure 
that they faced no reprisals. 
"In sharp contrast to the sacking of seve_ral army officers 
for failing to prevent the killings of unarmed demonstrators 
in &st Timor, eleven Indonesian officers in Aceh, includ-
ing nine members of the army special forces, Kopassus, 
were given special promotions in January 1992 for their 
role in suppressing the conflict with a ruthlessness that 
involved large number of extrajudicial executions, arbitrary 
detention and torture of civilians. With no significant exile 
population or interested external parties to focus attention 
on Aceh, no direct involvement of the United Nations, and 
no spectacular incidents in recent months to attract the local 
and international media, there has been no international 
pressure on the Indonesian government to account for 
deaths and disappearances over the last two years or 
investigate the behavior of the armed forces in Aceh. The 
much-:needed attention to the East Timor massacre and its 
aftermath should not obscure other violations by the 
Indonesian army. In particular, a full and impartial investi-
gation into abuses in Aceh should be set in motion." 
State Department on abuses in Aceh 
The US State Department's Chapter on Indonesia in its 
annual report on the human rights situation around the 
world, issued in February 1992, has some harsh words to 
say about conditions in Aceh. 
"There are credible reports of a pattern of abuse against 
the civilian population in Aceh by security forces.... These 
include summary executions of suspected Aceh Merdeka 
supporters - part of an effort to intimidate or eliminate 
potential rebel sympathisers-- as well as the incitement of 
villagers to summarily kill suspected guerrillas. Substanti-
ation of individual cases is often Jacking and rebel forces 
doubtless have caused some civilian deaths, but government 
forces clearly appear to be responsible for the majority of 
these civilian deaths. While some military commanders 
have acknowledged privately that excessive force was 
sometimes employed by their troops, the Government has 
denied a pattern of abuse, and no charges have been 
brought against members of the security forces in connec-
tion with the civilian deaths." 
Aceh at the UN Human Rights Commission 
The leader of Aceh Merdeka, Tengku Hasan di Tiro, made 
a submission on the right of self determination of Aceh to 
the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in February. 
Last year he spoke to the Human Rights Sub-commission. 
The deplorable level of state violence in Aceh was also part 
of a submission made by Liem Soei Liong, speaking on 
behalf of the London-based organisation, Liberation. The 
French organisation ACAT, represented by H. Fauzi pres-
ented a submission on the use of torture in Indonesia where 
Aceh was used as example. 
West Papua: The 
Obliteration of a 
People 
The first two editions of this book 
appeared in 1983 and 1984. This 
third edition; published in response 
to continuing demand, has been 
substantially revised and updated, 
with new data on military operations, 
an appendix on the murder of the 
well-known West Papuan anthropol-
ogist, Arnold Ap, and recent informa-
tion about the exploitation of West 
Papua's natural resources. 
Published by Tapol, the 
Indonesia:· Human Rights 
Campaign. 160pp. 
Price: £3.50 Sterling 
plus postage 
Tapol, 111 Northwood Road, 
Thornton Heath, Surrey CR4 
8HW, UK 
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The Kooijmans report 
A report presented to the UN Human Rights Commission by Pr:ofessor P. Ko.oijmans, UN. ~pecial 
Rapporteur on Torture, following a visit to Indone~ia and E~st Timor last year is st~ongly critical of 
the Indonesian judiciary for failing to protect detainees again_st the scu~g_e of torture. A request from 
the UN for him to visit Aceh was not granted by the Indonesian authorities. 
Much of the report is devoted to an examination of deten-
tion and . interrogation procedures insofar as they fail to 
provide protection to detainees against the use of torture. 
For the initial period of detention, a detainee is in the hands 
of the police which is part of the armed forces; often, 
especially in political cases, the detainee is held by the 
army. Kooijmans noted that during police detention, whic~ 
is when interrogation and most torture takes place, there is 
no judicial control at all. Although detainees may cbaJJenge 
their arrest in pre-trial hearings, these hearings do not allow 
a detainee to complain of treatment. A complaint of torture 
can only be lodged with the police, the very agency 
responsible for the abuse. 
It is only in court, if the detainee goes on trial, that a 
complaint can be made; however, as a member of the 
judiciary admitted to Kooijmans, at this late stage, it is 
difficult for a judge to examine the complaint but must rely 
on the documents filed and ,proceedings during tile trial. 
Although the Procedural Code (KUHAP) does not permit 
detention by the army, . this happens especially in areas of 
civil unrest such as East Timor and Aceh. Such practices 
are illegal, said Kooijmans, yet even so, evidence obtained 
during military detention finds its way into. the file and 
there is no provision which forbids the judge from taking 
such evidence into consideration. 
Such arrangements are at odds with the provisions 
adopted by consensus by the UN General Assembly in 
1988, "Principles for the Pro!ection of All Persons under 
Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment". 
Having dealt at some length with the inadequacies of the 
judiciary, Kooijmans delivered a stinging rebuke to the 
President of the Supreme Court, (ret'd) General Ali Said: 
"He [the Rapporteur] deeply regrets that the President of 
the Supreme Court, whom he had asked to see, was of the 
opinion that a meeting with him would not be useful since 
torture practices concerned mainly the executive branch. 
The Special Rapporteur can only conclude that such a 
reaction seems to confirm that, in Indonesia, the judiciary 
is not aware of the importantfunction it has in suppressing 
and eradicating torture. A vigilant judiciary is indispens-
able if the struggle against torture is to be s.uccessful." . ,. 
Anti-subversion law should be repealed 
Professor Kooijmans also criticises the Anti-Subversion 
Law and recommended its repeal. Its definition of subver-
sion is "broad and loose". It is not necessary "that the acts 
concerned actually have the effect of endangering the 
security; it is sufficient that they might have had that effect. 
Procedurally, subversion cases fall outside KUHAP. The 
Attorney-General may order a person to be held for up to 
a year (as compared to 60 days under KUHAP). No pre-
triaJ proceedings can be started, nor can the detention be 
subjected to any other form of judicial control. Although its 
legality is disputed, "no judicial body so far has declared 
the Anti-Subversion Law to be invaJid while a considerable 
number of people have been convicted under it". 
Visit to East Timor 
Professor Kooijmans arrived in East Timor on 11 Novem-
ber, the day before the Santa Cruz massacre but he was 
kept in the dark. He outlines briefly what happened, saying 
he was only informed of the event "at a very Jate moment". 
He met privately with five persons whom he had asked to 
meet following reports that they had been subjected to 
torture. "They all seemed afraid and some expressed anxiety 
at being rearrested and subjected to torture after th~ Special 
Rapporteur left East Timor. (He) told them that the fact of 
publishing their names in a UN report should constitute a 
guarantee against any harassment." 
The day after the massacre, on the way. to the airport, 
Professor Kooijmans asked to be taken to the hospital 
where dozens of wounded were being treated. "This request 
was refused, with the explanation that a visit by the Special 
Rapporteur to the wounded would be interpreted as 'UN 
endorsement of anti-government' forces and could lead to 
more rioting." The section on East Timor ends with another 
stinging rebuke: 
The Special Rapporteur regrets being obliged to put on 
record his feelings of astonishment and disappointment at 
not having been informed promptly by the military author-
ities of F,ast Timor about the incident o/12 November 1991. 
Recommendations 
Besides his call for the repeal of the anti-subversion law, 
Professor calls for "greater awareness within the judiciary 
of its role" in protecting enforcement of respect for human 
rights. "The independence of the judiciary should be 
scrupulously respected." The problem is that such a recom-
mendation remains a forlorn hope under the present regime 
which is a negation of the Trias Politicas. Other recomm-
endations - that an arrested person's right of access to a 
laywer, and that alJ evidence obtained in a way which is not 
in conformity with the law should be dismissed in court -
will suffer the same fate for this reason. 
The Special Rapporteur also said Indonesia should accede 
to the 1966 UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which it has 
neither signed or ratified. Indonesia should also ratify the 
1984 Convention Against• Torture and other CrueJ, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
Most of Professot Kooijmans's findings are well known to 
Indonesian human rights lawyers and advocates of . human 
rights around the world. The advantage lies only in having 
them set out in a UN document for use as a yardstick 
against the authorities. 
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Human rights briefs 
Ban on return home of dissidents 
A new law on immigration passed last month includes an 
article giving the government powers to prevent the return 
home of Indonesian citizens who engage in what the 
authorities deem to be anti-Indonesian activities. The article 
was proposed as an amendment from the armed forces 
faction to the draft law presented to Parliament by the 
government. The Justice Minister accepted the amendment 
after consulting with the President. This in effect means 
depriving Indonesians of their citizenship. 
The law also empowers the executive to prevent 
Indonesian citizens from leaving Indonesia or prevent 
foreigners from entering Indonesia. The armed forces 
spokepetson said it was necessary to anticipate cases where 
citizens fled abroad to seek protection, such as people who 
fled at the time of the 1965 upheavals, or fJetilin members 
trying to get back in. During the discussion, the Marcos 
regime's attitude to Aquino's return was also mentioned, 
hinting that some people fear there may be someone abroad 
who wants to challenge Suharto for the presidency. 
The only party group to speak out against the proposal 
was the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia whose representative 
described the decision as a serious violation of human 
rights. He said: "If (Indonesian citizens) abroad are sus-
pected of doing anything against · the state, they can be 
prosecuted at home according to the law." 
Sudomo threatens to move against NGOs 
Admiral (ret'd) Sudono, Minister-Coordinator for Political 
and Security Affairs, has announced that an implementary 
regulation will soon be enacted placing non~goveQJmental 
organisations (NGOs) within the terms of 1985 Law No 8 
on Social Organisations. He said the purpose was not to 
tum them into 'yes men' butto have them regulated under 
the 1985 law. · "Everyone under the sun must want to be 
regulated by that law. If an NGO doesn't want this, then it 
will have to dissolve." 
Up to the present, many NGOs were breaching the 
conditions laid down in the 1985 law, he claimed, for 
instance by receiving funds from abroad without first 
consulting the government. The law stipulates that 
organisations can be disbanded if they violate the regula-
tions. This includes receiving · money from abroad and 
helping foreign bodies without the knowledge of the 
government. They can also be disbanded for doing things 
that disrupt the public interest. [Pelita, 30.I.1992) 
Asia Watch barred from Indonesia 
Sidney Jones, the executive director of the New York-
based human rights group Asia Watch, has been barred 
from entering Indonesia after a recent visit to the country. 
Sidney Jones was informed on 8 November when departing 
from Jakarta's Sukarno-Hatta airport that she had been 
placed on the Immigration Department's blacklist. In the 
past- year, Asia Watch has published reports critical of 
Indonesia's human rights record in Aceh and in East Timor. 
[Far Eastern Economic Review, 20.II.1992) 
'Guidance' for ex-:tapols 
248 former political prisoners who had been arrested, but 
never charged or tried for being members of the Indonesian 
Communist Party, banned in 1965 when the military came 
to power, have been required to attend indoctrination 
sessions by the authorities in · Kebayoran Baru, a Jakarta 
suburb. The purpose was to reinforce their comprehension 
of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. They have now 
been declared eligible to take part in the 'festival of demo-
cracy', the term by which Indonesian general elections are 
known. [Pelita, 12.III.1992] 
This brief item of news draws attention to a 'guidance' 
session in one comer of the country. It is a reminder that 
hundreds of thousands of men and women are still, after 
more than a quarter of a century, being treated as political 
pariahs, in need of indoctrination. 
Forum Demokrasi meeting banned 
An MP has criticised the West Java police for stopping a 
routine meeting of Forum Demokrasi in Bogor, West Java, 
saying that the meeting did not pose any threat to security. 
Marzuki Darusman said the government should not be 
suspicious because the Forum was concerned only with the 
promotion of democracy. 
"Forum Demokrasi was established in line with the 
principles of democracy and it is distasteful to stop its 
gathering," said Marzuki, a member of Commission I on 
defence and security and GOLKAR member of Parliament. 
The meeting was convened fo review the Forum's policies 
and to emunerate the criteria for those wanting to partici-
pate in its activities. Attended by about 50 people, it was 
stopped by local police who said a permit from police 
headquarters in Jakarta was required. The police ignored 
Forum coordinator Abdurrachman Wahid's guarantee that 
the meeting posed no threat to security. 
"The police should attend to more serious security affairs 
instead of wasting time over a gathering of democracy 
activists," said Marzuki. [Jakarta Post, 25.II.1992] 
continuation from page 18 
laying flowers at the Santa Cruz cemetery in memory of the 
180 East Timorese massacred last November. Yet in the 
context of East Timorese tradition, we were still able to 
honour those slain. The East Timorese believe that flowers 
thrown into the sea to pay reverence to the deceased wilJ be 
received by their spirits on the peak of Mount Ramelau, 
East Timor's high~st mountain. After reciting words of 
prayer in a dozen languages, we threw wreaths, flowers, 
and olive branches given to us by the East Timorese 
communities in Lisbon and Darwin into the sea, all while 
navy helicopters circled noisily above." 
Lorne Riller, member of the US group . ..... J;- .. 
. c::'.'!.='Lt 
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Ambitions to become a high-tech ABRI 
The Indonesian Navy s show of force to turn back Lusitania Peace Mission was a display of the 
regimes jingoism and militarism. The event was used by ABRI to conduct a combined military 
manoeuvre and show their military muscle. ABR/s ambition to become a regional military superpower 
is clear and for this they need a well-equipped and high-tech armed forces. 
The Lusitania with a hundred students and journalists on 
board was hardly a threat to the Indonesian armed forces, 
but the Navy confronted it with a large fleet of destroyer, 
frigates, corvettes, patrol boats, to beat back a rather 
decrepit, unarmed ferry boat. 
Indonesia, key defence market 
Discussing ABRI's ambition~ to acquire new weapons, 
Military Technology [February 1992) notes that 'Something 
big is brewing'. In RENSTRA. V [ABRI's Five-..,Year Plan 
1993-1998) the focus will be on developing the air force 
and navy while the army will enhance its capability for 
rapid deployment. There is a plan to purchase 20 FG-90 
class of frigates. One lead ship will be built overseas with 
the main contenders in the UK, Holland, Germany and 
China. The other 19 units will be built at the PAL shipyard 
in Surabaya. The vessels will be equipped with an inte-
grated system for which rival bids have come from Holland 
Signaal, Westinghouse, Rockwell and TST. 
Helicopters at Dili airport Photo: N. Kumar 
Other vessels to be acquired by ALRI are three FPB-57 
patrol boats (design by Liirssen and built atPAL), another 
two amphibious I.BT vessels, two Tripartite (Alkmaar) type 
MCMV boats and two type 200/1300 submarines to be 
awarded to the German firm HDW. 
The purchase of refurbished vessels will continue. On 17 
February it was reported that Britain will sell an ex-Royal 
Navy ship "Green Rover" to Indonesia. The sale worth £11 
million is for a 7,200 tonnes 460 ft supply vessel to be 
refurbished by Swan Hunter in Tyneside. Whitehall delayed 
the announcement of the sale to allow time for the shock 
generated by the First Tuesdliy, Yorkshire film on East 
Timor to subside. 
A URI, the air force, is also planning new purchases. The 
recent agreement between IPTN and British Aerospace wilJ 
pave the way for the purchase of the HA WK 200 as replac-
ement for A4 Skyhawks. The deal involves 30-34 aircraft. 
For training purposes, Indonesia will acquire around 10 
HA WK 1 OOs and HAWK (j()s. . 
Another BOT (Build, Operate, Transfer) deal is being 
negotiated between IPTN and General Dynamics for the 
purchase of 36 F-16A and 12 F-16B fighter planes. IPTN 
will receive a considerable part of the workshare. 
The army will acquire new armoured vehicles, anti-tank 
and anti-aircraft weapons and new artillery systems. Many 
lessons are being learnt from the experiences fighting the 
guerillas in East Timor, Aceh and West Papua. The two 
special KOSTRAD rapid deployment battalions will be 
supplied with the most advanced weaponry so as to be 
combat-ready a.nd available throughout the country. 
ABRI's shopping-list is obviously much longer than this 
and the arms industry in many countries are seeking the ear 
of the Indonesian officials for big deals. 
Indonesia, a regional super power 
Renstra V comes at a time of rapid global changes and the 
end of the cold war. Indonesia's top military figures have 
anticipated these changes and want Indonesia to play a 
major · role in the security 'vacuum' of Southeast Asia and 
the Pacific. The Indonesian armed forces, traditionally 
staunchly natfonalist and cautious about commitments with 
other countries, is now loosening the reins.,. Vice Admiral 
Soedibyo Rahardjo, chief of the general staff of ABRI, said 
.. recently that Indonesia w:ould step up jpint naval exercises 
with the US and may eventually . engage in joint air force 
training, something unthinkable a few years ago. Indonesia 
has also withdrawn its objections to Singapore's plans to 
allow the US air and naval forces access for repair main-
tenance, resupply and training exercises and has joined the 
ASEAN chorus to open its dockyards to US warships. As 
Admiral Soedibyo explains: 'We understand the need for 
this kind of thing since the presence of American forces, to 
be quite honest, is needed to maintain stability in this part 
of the world' (International Herald Tribune, W Febr . .,-1 
March 1992). He hopes that the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the gradual and partial withdrawal of the US 
Seventh Fleet from the region should .be accompanied by an 
enhanced role for ABRI and should not be left to the other 
Asian giants, China, India and Japan. Admiral Soedibyo 
need not worry too much about a US retreat from the 
region. With the eclipse of the Soviet threat, the US has 
extended its sway in the region. New agreements with 
Singapore, Brunei, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand 
(Aotearoa) have been signed. The loss of Subic Bay in the 
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Philippines is being compensated many times over. Last 
September, Admiral David Jeremiah, vice-c~airman of ~he 
Joint Chiefs of Staff justified the US expansion by statmg . 
that the US strategic commitment to the Pacific was 
'separate and isolatable' from the cold war. 
iiiiiiiiiiiiiii 
President Suharto proudly carrying assault r}fle SS-1/W-1 
produced by PT PINDAD in Bandung. Minister Habibie, on the 
kft,is the one who heads all the arms-producing companies. 
Indonesia's aspirations to become a regional watchdog has 
several dimensions. Geopolitically, Indonesia is by far the 
largest country in the region. Increasing military cooper-
ation, agreements and joint training exercises have been 
developed with its neighbours. With Malaysia and PNG, 
each with specific 'problems' (Aceh and West Papuan 
refugees), joint border patrols and other activities have been 
deveioped. Both countries take a cautious approach towards 
'big brother' Indonesia while Jakarta takes a paternalistic 
attitude towards its two smaller neighbours. 
Then there are the dazzling ambitions of BJ .Habibie, 
Indonesia's Minister of Technology. This minister, seen as 
a foster son of President Suharto, is determined to develop 
a high-tech military industrial complex (MIC) to supply the 
entire Southeast Asian region, from the highly marketable 
Super PUMA and Bell 412 helicopters, manufactured at 
IPTN, to different types of civilian aircraft. The PAL 
dockyard in Surabaya is expanding fast and can produce a 
wide range of vessels. The expanding economies of coun-
tries in the region could boost Habibie's ambitions. His 
credo is simple: through the introduction of a high-tech 
military industry, a spin-off to other industries wil1 have a 
'trickle-down' effect over the entire economy. His concept 
enjoys the backing of the . president, ~~d . th.e state has 
poured bil1ions of dollars mto the m1htanshc plans of 
Indonesia's high-tech supremo. Habibie's plans also have 
the support of the top brass of ABRI and fit in with their 
plans to enhance Indonesia's position .. in the region. 
Setbacks 
But there have been setbacks. The hopes of producing 
profits have proved unachievable and the state has had to 
pour money in. The sale of a few helicopters . or airplanes 
has not made up for the heavy losses. The global rec~ssio~ 
has Jed to stagnation for Habibie's MIC. The drop m ml 
prices in the mid-eighties was a bad period for Habibie and 
he was forced to shelve some of his plans. 
At the same time, the Indonesian economy has c~anged 
from a 'petroleum economy' into a modem, export-onented, 
manufacturing economy. Habibie's spin-off theory has only 
worked for a small group of conglomerates which have 
swiftly developed a sophisticated intemation?I netw?rk. The 
state-Jed industries like Habibie's were laggmg behmd. The 
fast expanding manufacturing industry has also used good 
connections with the Suharto family. Suharto's interests in 
Habibie's projects may have faded as the other side of the 
economy has expanded, creating huge profits for the first 
family. By 1990 Habibie's pet projects gradually began. to 
fade. A serious heart-attack in 1991 and a bypass operation 
incapacitated him, leaving him watching from the sidelines. 
The next elections and the MIC. 
The ambitious plans of Habibie and AB~ ca~ only p~oce~d 
if certain changes occur after the presidential election m 
1993. If nothing changes, Suharto will serve a sixth term 
and the vice-presidency wil1 be crucial for the development 
of Indonesia's MIC and the procurement of weapons. 
Habibie's name has been mentioned as a candidate, if his 
health permits. Suharto might well take him as 'running-
mate'. 
Habibie has recently emerged as a politician with con-
siderable Muslim backing. He became chairman of ICM/ 
(/katan Cendekiawan Muslim.in Indonesia, Organisation of 
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals), an asset for Indonesia's 
high-tech czar. If he fails to become vice-president, the 
appointment of any ABRI top-brass could pave the way for 
the developments described above. 
The need for an arms embargo 
There are many rational and humane arguments against the 
further militarisation and enhancement of Indonesia's 
military role in the region and its procurement of weapons. 
Foremost is the global trend to cut back defence expendi-
tures. In the case of Indonesia, this is even more valid. 
Indonesia remains poor even by Southeast Asia standards. 
As the fourth most populous country in the world, it has 
many mouths to feed and any expenditure on defence is 
indefensible. 
But equally important is the fact that Indonesia, one of the 
worse human rights violators must not be allowed to 
continue with their heinous crimes. As voices grow louder 
to stop aid to Indonesia, an arms embargo is the least the 
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PEACE BOAT 
Warships turn back Timor Peace Mission 
We publish below extracts from two people, one from the US and one from the UK who were on board 
the Lusitania Expresso, an old Portuguese car-ferry which was chartered by a Portuguese student 
organisation to sail to Dili. The Peace Mission for Eas( Timor planned to sail into Dili and lay wreaths 
at the Santa Cruz cemetery, to commemorate the victims of the Santa Cruz massacre on 12 November. 
An illegal threat of force 
"/ tell you directly to leave this area. You are now in 
Indonesian te"itory. Turn back immediately or force will be 
used. " The warning issued from the bridge of one of the 
Indonesian warships shadowing the Peace Mission. 
"Before leaving Darwin, the flat-bottomed peace boat had 
been buzzed twice by Indonesian planes. This paled into 
insignificance when set aside threats by hardline Indonesian 
MPs to blow up the boat. 
''lbese intimidating tactics did create greater apprehension 
for the participants, but also served to fuel the interest of 
the international media in the mission and of putting more 
restraint on what the . Indonesians could get away with. To 
this extent, the eye of the world was upon the Indonesians 
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171e a/and of &st 1imor secured by three layers of defence 
again# the 'threat' of the Peace Boat. 
"On March 9, over 400 well wishers from the East Tim-
orese community finally saw the Lusitania depart from 
Darwin port. As we left there was a feeling of euphoria 
throughout the boat and also an indescribable calm until 
2.00pm the next day when Indonesian planes buzzed the 
boat, this time five times. At 11.30 that night, the glow of 
a single light was seen on the horizon. As the Lusitania 
maintained its course, the orange glow grew brighter as it 
changed its direction and speed to exactly that of our own. 
Keeping precisely the same distance from us, this indistin-
guishable vessel shadowed the peace boat throughout the 
night. Despite numerous attempts to make contact, no 
communication was established. 
"At 7.50am the first direct contact was made with the 
Indonesian warship, now joined by two others just south oJ 
the East Timorese '12 mile limit'. A warning was issue 
while two helicopters hovered overhead. The Indonesian 
commander stated there would be no discussion despite 
attempts by Rui Marques, the mission's director to contact 
the warship. The Lusitania held its position until the eighth 
repeat warning. At all times, three Indonesian warships 
manoeuvred themselves to be sideways to our boat. Their 
guns were on us. 
"This illegal threat of force left our captain with no choice 
but to comply with the Indonesian's command. With the 
East Timorese mountainous terrain in the background, the 
Lusitania turned on its port side and proceeded slowly 
southwards. An emotional wreath laying ceremony was held 
on deck. Prayers for the future freedom of the East TUll-
orese were said in eight languages. Throughout the ceremo-
ny the Indonesian intrusion was felt as their helicopters 
clattered overhead. As members of the mission cried on 
deck, all three Indonesian frigates continued to shadow our 
southwards course". 
Tim Slater, a student from London 
The Lusitania and George Bush . 
"For those of us aboard the Lusitania Expresso, it has been 
an astonishing Wednesday morning, but half way around 
the world it is still Super Tuesday. Yet I can state with 
conviction that none of the .[US presidential) candidates are 
putting East Timor high on their foreign policy agenda. 
"Especially for former CIA director -George Bush, who 
understands fully the embarrassing parallels between Iraq's 
illegal occupation of Kuwait and Indonesia's illegal annex-
ation of East Timor, any mention of the situation would 
further puncture his already-deflated "foreign policy 
president" balloon. 
"Even for the enlightened Jerry Brown, who has been 
afforded the luxury of becoming a presidential candidate by 
his family's flow of Indonesian oil wealth, East Timor 
{whose oil reserves could make Australia a net exporter for 
a half-century), is a touchy subject indeed. Only Tom 
Harkin had kept the genocidal situation in East Timor on 
the congressional agenda. 
"The captain of the Lusitania Expresso was told seven 
times to tum back or risk retaliation. At no time did the 
Indonesian commander allow us to plea the case we had 
hoped to articulate: international law do.es not recognize 
Indonesia's authority over East Timor and we should 
therefore be allowed to proceed without further molestatioL. 
The captain, who had been informed by Reuters in Jakarta 
last night that the Indonesians unequivocally intended to 
sink the unarmed peace ship, was not prepared to run the 
risk of provocation by his persistence. 
"We were prevented from achieving our objective l'f 
continued on page 15 
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Jf!EBT PAPUA 
Renewed fighting in Merauke: more Papuans flee 
As OPM guerilla activity seems to be gathering momentum, causing a new flow of refugees into Papua 
New Guinea, the spotlight is focusing on the closer cooperation between PNG and Indonesia. PNG is 
far more tolerant of border incursions by Indonesian soldiers than of the fear-driven flight of hundreds 
of West Papuan villagers. 
In the first two months of this year the OPM staged two 
offensives against Indonesian forces near the southern end 
of the PNG border, according to reports in the Indonesian 
press. The. fust, on 25 January, was on the police station in 
Sota village. The fighting left one OPM member dead and 
several Indonesian soldiers wounded, according to 
Indonesian press reports. In the wake of the , incident, 
hundreds of Sota villagers fled into PNG in fear for their 
lives [Wires, Jan 28). A further dash on 27 February in the 
same region sent villagers of Erambu fleeing into neigh-
bouring Jagebob village .[Jakarta Post, 6 March 9]. 
OPM warriors (photo: Claudio von Planta) 
In recent years, reports of such OPM attacks have been 
relatively few and far between, the last being in June last 
year at Batom village, Jayapura district. More has been 
heard of the Indonesian army's often violent operations in 
pursuit of OPM guerillas, both in West Papua and in PNG. 
In October 1991, a special task force of the Kodam VIII/-
Trikora (East Indonesia military command) carried out an 
operation in Yabandatua village, Senggi province, in the 
light . of information on the location of an OPM hideout. 
Three guerillas were shot dead [Ti/a lrian, 1 Nov 91). 
In November, the PNG Times printed a Jetter from a 
school teacher in Boset viJlage, Western province in PNG, 
reporting that villagers had moved into hunting camps in 
fear of an Indonesian army attack. Their fear was based on 
the activities of two armed men who recently visited their 
village seeking information on the whereabouts of OPM 
guerillas, and drawing up maps of the area. 
Following the OPM attack on Sota in January this year,. 
Indonesian soldiers pursued the guerrillas into PNG at 
Weam: on seeing these soldiers, PNG villagers fled. Parry 
Zeipi, the MP for South Fly in the PNG parliament, called 
on the PNG defence minister to deploy defence personnel 
in the border area to provide security for villagers. These 
people have good grounds for their response: the violent 
behaviour of Indonesian soldiers in a series of border 
incursions in 1990 is not easily forgotten (see TAPOL 
Bulletin 101). 
Indonesia seems unceasing in its practice of border 
incursions. Yet it has never been allowed the right of _'hot 
pursuit' on PNG soil, nor has it been able to persuade PNG 
to carry out joint border control activities. The latest Status 
of Forces Agreement signed between the two countries in 
January this year makes no legal change to this situatwn. 
Where it provides for cooperation is in the fields of military 
equipment, training, and 'civic action' programmes. While 
for PNG villagers, this last provision may mean access to 
shopping at Indonesian village cooperatives, so far it seems 
to consist of intimidation by Indonesian soldiers. 
Refugees 
Whereas Indonesia is preoccupied with curbing the OPM's 
newfound momentum, PNG is troubled by the latest influx 
refugees. 
At fust it was reported that some 1500 villagers from the 
Sota area had fled over the border at Weam. But by the 
time the refugees had been moved to lndorodoro, their 
number was put at little more than 200. There is great 
scope for numerical discrepancy in estimations of this kind. 
The PNG border is not always immediately apparent to 
West Papuans, either geographicaJJy · or as a boundary to 
kinship and traditional land rights. This has always pres-
ented problems for the PNG authorities when dealing with 
the sensitive issue of immigration. While Indonesia uses 
the universal term of 'border crossers', PNG has tried to 
distinguish between traditional border crossers (crossing 
because the border divides their family or land), asylum-
seekers and ilJegal immigrants. But these have in practice 
pr-oved fine lines to draw. 
Since the early '1980s, PNG's ever cJoser ties with Indo-
nesia have meant that there is no longer much chance for 
OPM supporters - active or no ..:. to receive protection from 
PNG: if detected, -they are deported as ilJegal immigrants. 
The most recent example is the case of two OPM members 
who last year visited their family in Kiunga, PNG, and were 
thus apparently • crossing for 'traditional' purposes. They 
were arrested and are soon to be placed in the hands· of the 
Indonesi<UI authorities. [Times of PNG, 9 Sept 91; Suara 
Papua, Jan/Feb 92]. Given the fate of deportees to Indo-
nesia in the past, there may well be cause for concern about 
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their treatment [see West Papua: The Obliteration of the 
People, plOl). 
For West Papuans who flee over the border out of fear, 
things are not much better. During the 1980s, repatriation 
has increasingly been the focus of refugee management 
policies in PNG. Repatriation would often not be to the 
village of origin, but to transmigration or special 'pacificat-
ion' settlements run by the Indonesian government. So it is 
not surprising if many who fled from Sota do not wish to 
present themselves as asylum-seekers. It may help explain 
how the number of refugees fe]) so dramatically from initial 
estimates. On previous occasions, when fear-driven West 
Papuans have fled over the border, many have spent years 
in the forest before arriving at a refugee camp. 
Three weeks after the Sota viIJagers fled it was reported 
that 211 people at Indorodoro are to be repatriated. The 
impetus for this move seems to have come from "the PNG 
government's desire to return the Sota people immediately." 
(Jakarta Post, 15.Il.92). The "burden" of the refugees on 
the PNG government seems to have been the paramount 
concern, and much credit to be won with Indonesia from 
returning the West Papuans. 
But whereas in 1986 an Indonesian repatriation pro-
gramme denied the UNHCR or the ICRC a role in monitor-
ing the returnees' homecoming, both agencies have been 
involved in the plight of the Sota viIJagers. The ICRC has 
said that the situation in Sota is safe for their return, while 
the UNHCR has guaranteed that the repatriation will only 
take place on a voluntary basis. (f o what extent and for 
how long returnees would be monitored is unknown.) 
Yet the UNHCR is not wiIJing to grant the Sota villagers 
refugee status, saying that fear of the military is not 
adequate grounds. So what is the alternative offered for 
those who do not want to return? The UNHCR has not yet 
answered this question from TAPOL. 
The plight of those in the camps has always been a 
sensitive question. In 1984, before the UNHCR could 
operate in PNG, the PNG government approach appeared to 
be "permitting conditions in camps to deteriorate, in order 
to try to persuade their inhabitants to go home", according· 
to one observer. In 1991, the UNHCR was to cut supplies 
of food and medicine to Iowara, East Awin camp since the 
inhabitants were supposed to be self-supporting (see 
TAPOL Bulletin 106). 
The UNHCR may lack adequate funds to provide support 
for any Sota villagers who do not wish to return home 
whilse PNG officials are trying hard to sway their minds: 
after visiting Sota, they reportedly returned with letters and 
videos from the children of those who crossed into PNG, 
pleading for their parents to return. 
Soldier found guilty of subversion 
A West Papuan serving in the Indonesian army, Zeth 
Rumkabu, 38, has been sentenced to six years under 
Indonesia's anti-subversion Jaw, for seJJing weapons to the 
OPM. Corporal Rumbaku was also dismissed from the 
army. (Sunday Age, 22.Ill.1992] 
OPM guerrilla leader outlines his strategy 
Bernard Mawen is the leader of the armed resistance movement, the OPM, in Merauke, the south-
eastern district of West Papua. His forces have engaged the Indonesian troops on several occasions 
since January. The following are excerpts from a letter he sent to TAPOL which reached us in mid-
March. 
"Our war is not against the Indonesian people, it is against 
the fascist clique under Suharto whose interest it is to 
protect the interests of imperialism, colonialism and 
monopoly capitalism and who trample on the rights and 
freedoms of we, the Melanesian people of West Papua. 
"I respect the Indonesian people for the struggle they 
waged against the Dutch and I would hope that they will 
respect our struggle. I feel a sympathy for the Indonesian 
people who live under a fascist regime. What we can do to 
show our sympathy for them is to condemn the western 
powers which, during the last war, fought against the Axis 
powers and have more recently condemned the South 
African apartheid regime. Yet, they now support the fascist 
government in Indonesia which is oppressing the 200 
million people of that country. They support it by supplying 
economic aid and weapons and do this through the 
intermediary of international agencies like the World Bank 
and the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia. They 
should be made to realise that such support destroys many 
nations in the world; if they do not heed us, we will take 
revenge by strong action against their interests in our 
country. We would prefer cooperation and mutual respect. 
Bernard Mawen, OPM Commander for the Merauke region. 
Photo: Claudio von PlantD 
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General elections are irrelevant 
"Our West Papuan people are now being required to 
participate in the Indonesian general elections. We cannot 
condemn or blame them for doing this because they have 
no alternative, they are being forced to join in - it is not 
voluntary. We respect their decision to take part for their 
own survival. Some think we should sabotage the election, 
but in my opinion, this tactic is not relevant. We have other 
tactics that are more important than sabotaging the electiQn. 
"Strategically speaking, I do not think that sabotaging the 
election will produce anything because it will not change 
the position of the fascist Suharto government. Even if 
Suharto is forced out, the fascists will still be in power. 
Changes can only occur by means of a physical movement 
WEST PAPUA 
throughout Indonesia; an election will change nothing. 
History proves that it is only by means of a physical 
revolution that a fascist regime can be overthrown. There 
are no instances in history of fascism being overthrown by 
normal processes such as general elections. The people of 
West Papua know this and do not look upon the election as 
an alternative strategy. · 
"I remain confident that we will succeed in ending the 
co)onisatioJJ of our country, West Papua, by the Indonesian 
fascist regime and that we will create a democratic and 
peace-loving West Papuan state." 
International support for Moi as they stand firm 
TAPOL has received more information about the demonstration of Moi people reported in the last 
issue. There is exploitation of extreme proportions. The victims are determined to fight off the loggers, 
PT lntimpura. A recent visitor to Sorong has written a disturbing report which TAPOL have published 
as Occasional Report no. 18. The report is arousing international support for the Moi people. In 
February, the First Forest Peoples Conference in Malaysia passed the following Resolution: 
We, the delegates to the Conference of the Indigenous .... 
Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests gathered from 12-15 
February 1992 in Penang, Malaysia, declare our commit'"" 
ment and solidarity with the struggle of the Moi people of 
West Papua. 
The Moi people of West Papua, numbering almost four 
thousand, live on the extreme western tip of the island, on 
the "beak" of the so-called "Bird's Head" Peninsula, in the 
environs of the town of Sorong. 
The neo colonialist military government of Indonesia has 
awarded PT Intimpura a vast 339,000 hectare logging 
concession in the heart of Moi ancestral land. 
We demand that the Indonesian government: 
respect the traditional land ownership of the Moi 
people, namely their legitimate indigenous rights based on 
their Melanesian culture and concept towards nature; 
stop immediately all logging activities in the Moi 
ancestral homeland; 
compensate all damage to the people and its forest, 
to be paid immediately, based on the demands of the people 
themselves; 
stop further exploitation of all forests in West 
Papua without the fuJJ and free consent of the indigenous 
people affected; 
respect the right to self-determination of all the 
indigenous peoples of West Papua; 
We, the indigenous/tribal peoples of the tropical forests, 
through our Charter, demand that the Indonesian govern-
ment respect the rights of all indigenous/tribal people 
communities in Indonesia as well as in West Papua. 
Moi villager pointing l(J a sign: INTIMPURA TIMBER CO -
SORONGARE EXPRESSLY FORBIDDEN FROM ENTERING L---====~=====~==== 
THE TERRITORY OF THE KLAY/LI VILLAGE, 
SUBDISTRICT OF MAKBON. 
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Famine victims are new targets for resettlement 
Following the Soba earthquake in 1989, 3500 Hupla people 
were moved, apparently without consultation, to a new 
lower-altitude settlement far from their traditional ]ands. 
The resettlement target at the time was 10,000 people from 
the region (Hup]a and Yali) by 1993. 'It remains to be seen 
what methods the government officials will employ to reach 
that target,' noted Carolyn Marr in 1990 (IWGL4 Newsletter, 
Dec 1990]. (See also TAPOL Bulletin 98]. 
Resettlement Programme 
The earthquake had provided a 'good' reason to move the 
Hup]a. When this was exhausted, when the government 
wanted to expand the programme to other vaBeys, and 
when the resettlement programme started to receive some 
harsh publicity, the government tried sending in teams to 
persuade rather than force people to move to Elelim, a new 
site located between Wamena and Jayapura, near Landikma. 
Yet these 'persuader teams' often had a forceful effect. 
With promises of TVs and electricity, they fuelled cargo-
istic expectations; with assurances of food and schooling, 
they made the local situation miserable in comparison. 
Many people moved. Families were split, the social struc-
ture fragmented as if struck, like the ]and, by an earthquake. 
Only those families fortunate enough to be reunited, 
because their relatives returned, disillusioned · with their new 
life at Elelim, have recovered from the trauma imposed by 
the programme. 
When the 'persuader teams' withdrew from their targeted 
villages, those who ha~ defied their efforts could not expect 
any further help from the government. Soba, where the 
efforts had been much more forceful, has in effect officially 
ceased to exist. Remaining villagers have been refused 
requests for rice on the basis that they should now be in 
EJelim. 
Famine 
TAPOL Bulletin 109 reported a famine in the subdistrict of 
Kurima. It has since transpired that some of the worst 
areas hit are those visited by 'persuader teams', for example 
in Ninia [Suara Pembaruan, 21.l.1992]. While the famine 
appears to have been the product of a number of factors, 
this particular coincidence suggests that the teams, while 
encouraging a new life for the villagers in Elelim, may have 
actually discouraged their preparations for a new garden 
season where they were. 
But Indonesian press reports have focused on one area 
that did not seem to have been the target of government 
teams: Silimo. While in other areas food shortages pad 
been overcome, it was said, here the famine was severe 
. , 
mdeed exceptional. 148 people of the Y a]i tribe are reported 
to have died, of around 8,000 at risk (Antara, l.III.1992; 
Reuter, 17.I.1992]. 
The reason? · Villagers were busy collecting coconuts in 
the forest, and forgot to harvest their gardens, according to 
JB Wenas, the district chief of Jayawijaya [Suara Pemba-
ruan, 17.I.1992]. This crude attempt a( a cultural explana-
tion, however, must be rejected. Coconuts do not grow in 
the highlands. The Yali coJlect Pandanas nuts, a scarce 
crop, from the forest. And it is neither only in Silimo nor 
only in 1991 that they have done this while also having 
gardens to tend. That they might have forgotten about their 
gardens last year seems improbable. 








Perhaps conscious of the insensitivity of Wenas' account, 
the Coordinating Minister for P~ople's,. Welfare, Genera] 
(ret'd) Soepardjo Rustam, promptly explained that heavy 
rains had -prevented people frQm cultivating their lands, 
causing food shortages [BBC, 5.II.1992]. This is much more 
in keeping with past experience in the New Guinea high-
lands, where food shortages are not uncommon. Tubers 
like sweet potatoes are very vulnerable to harsh weather 
conditions just after planting. But in the past, and apparent-
ly last year in other areas of Kurima, viJlagers have over-
come the resulting shortages by means of mutual assistance. 
So what happened in Silimo? 
Initial reports claimed that the food shortages had led to 
famine because the missionaries in Silimo were on holiday. 
The food· shortages that began in April were therefore not 
discovered until the missionaries returned in December 
[Suara Pembaruan, 17.I.1992] . But it seems implausible 
that people in Silimo need to rely on missionaries to 
communicate their situation. If a radio link was not avail-
able, the terrain between the Silimo and Wamena is clearly 
traversable: around 200 children from Silimo attend school 
i~ .Wamena (Suara Pembaruan, 30.I.1992] . The available 
picture of events thus seems uncomfortably inadequate. 
New opportunity for resettlement? 
~o ?ou~t reports. o.f the f~mine in S~imo. came as a blessing 
m disguise to officials trymg to fu]fd their EJelim relocation 
targets. The timing of events leaves one perplexed about the 
government's response to tl~e famine. The missionaries are 
said to have reported it in November 1991; JB Wenas said 
22 TAPOL Bulletin No. 110, April 1992 
he received the information on 19 December [Suara 
Pembaruan, 17.I.1992). But it was not until 17 January 
that he made the news public. And in the very same 
statement, Wenas announced the resettlement of 155 
families to Elelim. No officials are reported to have visited 
the area until 24 January. A team was landed by helicopter 
and tribal heads were then taken to Elelim to survey the 
site. Yet by 5 February, and with 25 more deaths since the 
initial report, stocks of food supplies were still sitting in 
Wamena, waiting for the weather to improve before they 
could be flown in to the mountainous area of Silimo [BBC, 
5.II.1992). By the time the aid reached them, the promises 
of Elelim must have sounded irresistible. Although when 
Soepardjo visited Silimo, he said people were reluctant to 
move [Indonesian Observer, 6.II.1992), by 1 March, 613 
people were reported to have been relocated. Weather, it 
seemed, ceased to hamper the 40 odd flights from Silimo to 
Elelim (Antara, l.III.1992; Tempo, 22.II.1992) 
The transportation of food supplies was in the end assisted 
by two helicopters provided by PT Freeport Indonesia. As 
with .the company's development around Tembagapura (see 
TAPOL Bulletin, 109), and as with the relocation of the 
Hupla (for which it provided $25 000), Freeport's latest 
promotion of resettlement in an area contracted to the 
company is true to style. (Freeport geologists have indeed 
recently been surveying the area south-east of Wamena.) 
Yet it is by no means obvious that resettlement is the best 
response to this -famine. In the long term, a consistent 
planting programme ensuring that crops are not all vulner-
able at the same time would be the wisest response, 
according to Dr Bourke at the Australian National Univer-
sity. Moreover, moving to Elelim will bring problems: on 
resettling, people suffer from the separation from their 
relatives and ancestral lands; they may experience tension 
because they are living on the traditional lands of others; 
and in Elelim, they face the threat of malaria, with which 
the Y ali, like the Hupla, are unfamiliar and so have no 
built-up immunity. 
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What is clear, however, is that those who are moved to 
Elelim will be far more accessible to the government, by 
means of the Wamena-Jayapura road under construction. 
And should Freeport want to operate in the southern 
Kurima subdistrict, they will meet Jess resistance from 
traditional land-owners, many of whom will be in Elelim. 
Increasingly, it seems, the government is prepared to 
encourage the break-up of traditional social fabric for the 
ends of national development. 
The Moi people 
against the loggers 
occasional reports no. 18 
The lndon~•I• Hum1n Right• C1mp1lgn 




Occasional Reports no. 18 contains a report of the struggle 
of the Moi people against a Jogging company. 
Protest actions against East Timor trials 
East Timor solidarity groups around the world decided to 
hold actions in mid March to protest against the trials of 
East Timorese now under way in Dili and Jakarta. There 
were protests outside the Indonesian consulates in Los 
Angeles and New York, a discussion about East Timor, 
including the trials, at the University of Toronto, a special 
meeting in Paris on 24 March, a mass meeting in The 
Hague on 21 March, and actions in Norway and Belgium. 
In Australia, a protest demonstration to 'Free the Timor 
detainees', was held on 12 March, the day on which the 
first trial opened in Jakarta. A new group in Ireland plans 
to hold vigils outside several embassies in Dublin on Good 
Friday and have invited an East Timorese refugee in 
London to attend. 
Memorial service in London 
In the UK, the fourth in a series of actions since 12 
November took place on 20 March. The main event, 
organised by the newly-established British Campaign for 
East Timor, was a well-attended Memorial Service for East 
Timorese victims of the massacre and for those now facing 
trial. The service was held at St Bride's Church, Fleet 
Street. Among the priests officiating were the Rt Rev. 
Patrick Kalilombe, former Bishop of Lilongwe, Malawi and 
Fr. Sarath Wasanta from Negombo, Sri Lanka. 
There were short addresses and readings by Hugh 
O'Shaughnessy, a journalist with The Observer who visited 
East Timor last year, James Gibbons, brother of Kamal 
Bamadhaj who was killed in the massacre, Estevao Cabral, 
a Timorese refugee in London, and John Joseet, a former 
political prisoner in Malaysia. 
A 'cage' protest took place the same afternoon outside the 
Indonesian embassy. English students who went to Australia 
to sail with the Lusitania Espresso Peace Mission took part. 
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Xanana Gusmao's message to solidarity groups 
Warm greetin~ friends and companions in struggle. I speak 
to you from the mountains of East Timor. We are betweep 
marches and combats and in our backpacks we carry the 
information we receive on the situation of generalised terror 
under which the Maubere people are living. 
If the 12 November massacre had happened two years 
earlier, it would have been unnoticed by the world. The 
massacre would not have had such wide repercussions if it 
had not been for the video that the British journalist 
managed to get out of East Timor. We are aware that a l.Ot 
of governments only took a definite stand after hearing 
about the film. It became the catalyst for international 
reaction, which was initially sceptical, as has been the 
custom in politics. 
There have been cases, as in Australia, where at every 
increasingly obvious violation of human rights in East 
Timor, Australia would send its ambassador, Philip Flood, 
to talk to the puppet governor and the military authorities 
and return saying he saw no evidence of violations. If this 
time Gareth Evans had been in Canberra -he would have 
sent his ambassador for more lunches with Carrascalao and 
shaken hands with the murderer Warouw and stated that the 
most recent grave in the Santa Clara cemetery was that of 
Sebastiao Rangel, there being no evidence of any massac~. 
The position taken by Holland, a tireless defender of the 
annexation of East Timor as a historiGally consiilttnt 
continuation of the process of annexation of Western Papua, 
was unanticipated and admirable. We also believe that the 
images of the film had an effect here. 
This film is our weapon, ours and yours, but mainly 
yours, for your work of raising the awareness of people and 
governments in the countries where your groups are based. 
We propose that all East Timor solidarity groups set up 
small groups to go to other countries where solidarity 
groups have not yet been set up, providing the opportunity 
for raising awareness about the problem and creating the 
conditions for setting up groups there. We are fully aware 
of all the difficulties, especially financial, in the running of 
your and our projects. We propose the following themes as 
general lines of action: 
1) The setting up of a UN or other international 
investigation team to verify the facts of 12 November. 
2) Putting pressure on governments to reconsider their 
complacent policies in relation to Indonesia and support 
Portugal's position. The difference in criteria adopted for the 
violation of Human Rights is notorious; a house arrest in 
Rangoon is enough to provoke the western powers to a 
storm of protest, but they continue to affirm their total 
respect for the cultural difference between Indonesia and 
the western world and justify the crimes committed by 
Indonesia as mere questions of national interest. 
3) Putting pressure on governments to maintain or apply 
cuts in economic aid to Indonesia as long as it refuses to 
allow a UN or international inquiry team to visit East 
Timor. Jakarta's arrogance comes from its commercial ties 
with Australia, Japan, UK, France, Spain, Holland etc. 
I express our sincere appreciation for your unstinted and 
unselfish solidarity work for the just cause of freedom for 
our people. Your work and dedication to the people of East 
Timor, bas been a moral incentive enabling us to believe in 
the solidarity of peoples involved in the common struggle 
for freedom, peace, justice, and progress. We especially 
hope for renewed effort from groups in the EC countries, in 
the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan so that the 
intentions announced at governmental, political, party and 
parliamentary levels are not forgotten. 
Jhe Maubere people after 16 years of a difficult war in 
difficult conditions, can only ask that you speak for them. 
J'o all of you, a warm embrace from all the fighters : of 
FALINTIL and from all our people, and a special greeting 
frOfll the National Council of Maubere Resistance. 
Honour and glory to the martyrs of the Maubere 
fatherland! Viva the people of East Timor! Viva 
international solidarity! Fatherland or death! The struggle 
0ontinues on all fronts! Resistance is victory ! 
General-headquarters of the National Council of Maubere 
Resistance the mountains of East Timor, 24 November 
1991. Kay Raia Xanana Gusmao Commander of F ALINTIL. 
In two languages English/French 
Published by Peace is Possible in East Timor 
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